- The ... passage you quote illustrates what's wrong with reporting on Iran: Every story is so narrowly focused on the ramifications for partisan politics in the United States that it completely ignores what was going on in Iran.
You say, "Reagan campaign officials ... may have actually negotiated with Iran behind the scenes..." (my ellipses). The problem with this sentence is that it gives no hint of *whom* the Reagan officials negotiated with, saying only "Iran", as if all of Iran represented a single political entity with which one could negotiate.
Iran in 1980 -- it ought to go without saying, but apparently it does not -- was in a state of political flux which dwarfs the U.S. election campaign between Carter and Reagan. We like to talk about the "Reagan revolution", but even if it was a major turn in American politics (I'm not convinced it was even that) it was surely not a revolution in the same sense that Iran's was.
To recap: in February 1979, the Iranian people overturned (peacefully) the absolute monarch who had ruled for 30 years, creating a completely new government. In November 1979, the provisional government collapsed, precipitating a new power struggle (rougher, but still mostly peaceful). In the course of this struggle, a fringe group, calling itself "Students of the Imam's Line", took hostage a group of Americans.
As the constitution was only a few months old, no party was securely in power. Even Khomeini, the one man who was held in near universal respect, did not run the government. Rather, he attempted to referee between his competing disciples (much like Washington watching over while Hamilton, Jefferson, and the others fought it out).
In this context, the obvious question is *which* Iranians did the Reagan team approach. Carter was also negotiating with "Iran" at that time. Specifically, his team was in conversation with President Bani-Sadr, who, in spite of some irregularities of the January election, had significant popular support and was generally considered the legitimate government. But Bani-Sadr's government was precarious and -- like Carter's re-election -- depended on his skill in solving his country's crises.
The main opposition to the president was the Islamic Republican Party, and this is the group that Reagan's team approached to make an agreement of mutual support. Just as this deal may have secured Carter's failure to be re-elected, it may well have secured the downfall of Bani-Sadr's presidency. Neither Bani-Sadr nor the IRP supported the seizure of the hostages by the Students. It was a political embarrassment to Bani-Sadr, who was eager to secure their release, but short of sending in commandos of his own he could only do so by persuading the Students to cooperate -- either by coaxing or by threat, and he had to take care not to do it in a way that didn't get him into trouble politically. This is what he was trying to negotiate with the Carter team.
Whether Reagan's people sabotaged the hostage rescue attempt, I don't know, but they certainly sabotaged Carter's negotiations. The deal the IRP made with the U.S. Republicans gave them a boost of political power, inspiring many to see Bani-Sadr as a lame duck. As a result, the Students chose to negotiate with the IRP rather than the president, agreeing to Reagan's timetable for release and rebuffing Bani-Sadr. Eventually the IRP went on to depose Bani-Sadr and after yet another power struggle (this one definitely not so peaceful) went on to establish the government of religious authoritarians which has run Iran ever since.
All of this is completely lost in facile accusations of "Nyah nyah, your team was caught doing business with the bad guys." (Interestingly, parallel accusations were rampant in the Iranian press in the mid-1980s, with various IRP leaders being tarred for having cut a secret deal with the Americans. The accusations were given more credence there than here, perhaps because, even then, the Iranian press was more free than the U.S. press).
This is not just an exercise in interesting but irrelevant details of Iranian politics. The important lesson here is a demonstration of how U.S. foreign policy, in spite of professing support for democratic regimes, ends up promoting authoritarianism. Why? Because authoritarian regimes can get results. Bani-Sadr, in spite of some irregularities of the election, was essentially a democratically elected leader. He was a prickly, vain man, and an Iranian nationalist. Although he wasn't avowedly anti-American, he wasn't pro-American either, and given the anti-American political climate at the time (owing to our support of the hated shah) no leader who had to face the electorate could cooperate with America too much.
Thus, the elected president was difficult to negotiate with. Furthermore, he might not get re-elected next time, in which case we'd have to start over with someone else. How much easier it is to cut a deal with the IRP. They weren't pro-American either. Indeed, outwardly they were even more anti-American than the president, but it didn't matter, because they could deliver the goods. For all its talk, all the United States really wanted was to get the hostages out and to secure the steady flow of oil. The IRP could do that. What the IRP wanted was weapons, money, and enough political instability for them to take advantage and take over. Reagan could do that. With a democratic leader of Iran, either side of the deal would be harder to negotiate. That's why, even though America never really intended to promote authoritarianism over democracy, it did so as a side effect of political expediency. The real crime of Reagan's policy, then, is not that he secretly did business with "Iran", but rather that he contributed to the ascendancy of a particular regime in Iran, and that regime happened to be the one we like the least.
The lesson remains relevant to this day, in both Iran and Iraq. With regard to Iran, members of the U.S. government are frequently expressing their moral support for the democratic reform movement in Iran. At the same time, our actions are supporting the vali faqih. Why? Because he can deliver the goods. What we want most from Iran right now is for them to shut down their nuclear weapons program. The democratic movement is basically for a peaceful Iran, but all you've got to show for it is the rhetoric of a bunch of activists who argue with one another, and who knows who will actually be elected? With Ali Khamenei, he can say the word and the nuclear program shuts down right now. That's a man we can do business with, and so we do.
In Iraq, you have a situation not unlike Iran in 1981. What form of government will come into play remains to be seen. Will the United States support popular democracy or authoritarianism? The administration is split on this. The Bush team's decision to invade Iraq was the result of a coalition of individuals within the administration, and they all had different motives. (That, incidentally, is why it's so hard to pin down what the "real" reason for invading Iraq was.) Some genuinely believe the Wolfowitz line about creating democracies; these are the ones who are going to be more sympathetic to a genuinely popular but potentially frightening leader like Ali Sistami. Others will give lip service to "democracy" but really care about having an Iraq that we can do business with. These will inevitably, and perhaps unintentionally, drift toward supporting authoritarian rule.
Among [the] comments, someone asks, "So, why can't someone in the Iranian government confirm this? Bush has pretty much decimated any bridges left with that country, and I don't see any reason why the Iranian government would hold back damning evidence of the 'October Surprise' or even Iran-contra."
This makes sense only if you're viewing the whole affair from the narrow view of U.S. partisan politics. By that reasoning, "Iran" is a single entity which is motivated by how their news will effect President Bush and the Republican Party.
What Iranian politicians care about is their own political career. Who exactly do you propose is going to offer up evidence? Anyone who was involved is going to commit political suicide by discussing this. He is going to tell the Iranian public that he participated in a secret deal with the U.S. government in order to gain power and weapons? Why? To discredit Bush? That makes about as much sense as Elliott Abrams spilling the beans in order to discredit Rafsanjani.
As for the opposition party, sure, they've got plenty of motive to discuss it, and sometimes they do. The opposition has plenty of criticisms it can level at the government, and this is just one of many, and a stale one at that. Those who knew what was going on have already said their piece. After Gary Sick's book came out, Bani-Sadr granted a series of long interviews in which he corroborated the whole affair in detail. It's all in his book.
A couple of observations:
-- Obviously, Mark is right to chide me for lumping the various factions involved in the hostage drama under the aegis of Iran. Though I obviously referred to the then-Iranian government, he is quite correct that the covert Reagan team was not bargaining with government officials but the IRP.
-- However, the questions in this case go well beyond mere neener-neenering. If these accounts prove accurate, the Reagan team's behavior in this instance constituted treason, by any definition of the term. As Mark suggests, the Reagan folk directly undermined government negotiations to free the hostages. If George H.W. Bush was a direct participant in this, it casts an even darker shadow on not only his presidency but his subsequent actions regarding Iran-Contra and Iraq, actions for which we continue to confront the consequences.
The issue, really, is one of history -- and we're talking about the kind of history that directly informs our current situation. Although these events occurred 24 years ago, there's nothing particularly stale about this -- as Mark himself rather clearly points out. The principals may indeed have said their piece, but sadly, the public is spectacularly unaware of this. The point is to put our current events in a clear and factual context that erases the mythology favored by Republican propagandists, who would have us get all misty-eyed over the wonders of the Reagan administration's moral clarity and farsighted vision.
After all, we are currently in a political environment in America in which it is a commonplace to characterize liberals as traitors and to suggest that they have behaved treasonously in our response to "the war on terror." What the October Surprise scenario makes clear is that not only are the Republicans now running the government the principal traitors here, but their entire approach to dealing with terrorists is a poisonous cauldron of deceit, both at home and abroad. And, as Mark suggests, it reveals the real hollowness of the neoconservative rhetoric about promoting democracy, when what we actually have done is shore up authoritarianism at every turn.
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